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Abstract
Background: Both scientists and the public routinely refer to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as being the ‘gold
standard’ of scientific evidence. Although there is no question that placebo-controlled RCTs play a significant role
in the evaluation of new pharmaceutical treatments, especially when it is important to rule out placebo effects,
they have many inherent limitations which constrain their ability to inform medical decision making. The purpose
of this paper is to raise questions about over-reliance on RCTs and to point out an additional perspective for
evaluating healthcare evidence, as embodied in the Hill criteria. The arguments presented here are generally
relevant to all areas of health care, though mental health applications provide the primary context for this essay.
Discussion: This article first traces the history of RCTs, and then evaluates five of their major limitations: they often
lack external validity, they have the potential for increasing health risk in the general population, they are no less
likely to overestimate treatment effects than many other methods, they make a relatively weak contribution to
clinical practice, and they are excessively expensive (leading to several additional vulnerabilities in the quality of
evidence produced). Next, the nine Hill criteria are presented and discussed as a richer approach to the evaluation
of health care treatments. Reliance on these multi-faceted criteria requires more analytical thinking than simply
examining RCT data, but will also enhance confidence in the evaluation of novel treatments.
Summary: Excessive reliance on RCTs tends to stifle funding of other types of research, and publication of other
forms of evidence. We call upon our research and clinical colleagues to consider additional methods of evaluating
data, such as the Hill criteria. Over-reliance on RCTs is similar to resting all of health care evidence on a one-legged
stool.
Background
The fact that so many pathological syndromes are
named after the individual who first characterized the
disorder illustrates that medicine has always valued
good clinical observations. In fact, one could argue that
most major discoveries in health have evolved from
observations first documented in case reports and case
series. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are often
mounted later to validate an intervention, especially in
comparison with a placebo, but as is well-recognised,
they are rarely major sources of scientific discovery. In
spite of the fact that observational data hold a time-
honored place in medicine, 21
st century methodology
has pre-empted several millennia of historical tradition
by anointing RCTs with the descriptive phrase ‘gold
standard’ of evidence [1].
There are many reasons why RCTs have become the
de facto standard by which all forms of evidence are
evaluated. No other study design rivals the RCT’sa b i l i t y
to eliminate selection bias and reduce the risk of a ser-
ious imbalance in known and unknown factors that
could influence outcomes (when the randomization pro-
cedure is executed properly). Our concern is that evi-
dence based medicine has made a leap from considering
RCTs to be a high standard to being the only standard.
The primary purpose of this paper is to question the
over-valuation of RCTs that Rosenbaum referred to as a
form of tyranny [2]. Our premise is that over-reliance
on RCTs has resulted in a foundation for decision-mak-
ing in health care that is as unstable as a one-legged
stool. The history and limitations of RCTs are first sum-
marized and then followed by suggestions for an
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second purpose of this paper is to propose greater use
of alternative forms of evidence. Depending on a variety
of sources leads to more stable and error-free conclu-
sions by providing other legs to stabilize the stool upon
which medical decision-making can rest.
History of RCTs
The use of randomized controlled trials predates the
actual term RCT by several centuries. One of the ear-
liest documented applications to health was the proof
that citrus prevented scurvy [3]. Scurvy routinely killed
> 50% of sailors on long voyages, no small impediment
to world exploration in the 14
th-18
th centuries. A diet-
ary factor was suspected in 1601 when Captain James
Lancaster administered a tablespoon of lemon juice per
day to each sailor on one ship: 0% of those on the ship
with lemon juice rations died, while 40% of those on
the three ships without lemon juice were dead halfway
through the journey to India. Replications and exten-
sions followed: e.g., in the mid-18
th century a ship phy-
sician named James Lind conducted a study in which
early signs of scurvy were effectively treated in those
randomly assigned to receive citrus, thereby showing
the ability of citrus to reverse the disease in its early
stages [3].
It was Sir Austin Bradford Hill (sometimes referred to
as Bradford Hill, or Bradford-Hill), a British statistician
and epidemiologist, who promoted the use of randomi-
zation for clinical trial research employed to test health
care interventions, a position he took prior to World
War II [4]. However, the issue became more prominent
in 1946 when the British Medical Research Council was
investigating the effect of streptomycin on tuberculosis.
The extreme shortages of streptomycin in England
caused considerable stress amongst physicians who were
constrained to use existing therapies despite reports of a
promising new intervention. The consensus at the time
was that the “small supply of streptomycin allocated to
it for research purposes would be best employed in a
rigorously planned investigation with concurrent con-
trols” (page 769) [5].
In 1962, RCTs were still quite rare, yet they were the
norm in 1992 when the Evidence-Based Medicine
Working Group published their seminal paper [6]. The
escalation of the importance of RCTs in this 30-year
period was influenced worldwide by significant decisions
made in the United States regarding premarket approval
of drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
It was section 355(d) of the 1962 Drug Amendments to
the American Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which
changed procedural requirements in the United States
[7]. This clause was the first time FDA introduced the
requirement of what they referred to as ‘effectiveness’
for its approval, in addition to the previous requirement
of safety, a change that led directly to incorporating ran-
domization and blinding into studies [7]. According to
Kulynych’s historical review, consideration of public
safety was the basis of the requirement for effectiveness:
if an ineffective drug replaces one of proven value, peo-
ple can be harmed. Thus, even though the primary man-
date had previously been safety of drugs, the rationale
that led in 1962 to section 355(d) evolved from recogni-
tion of the importance of effectiveness for the demon-
stration of safety. Litigation that followed the Drug
Amendment clarified that RCTs would be required as
proof of efficacy, and hence meeting the safety require-
ment. The new statute also required that pharmaceutical
companies provide “substantial evidence” consisting of
“adequate and well-controlled investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training” to demonstrate effective-
ness of a new drug. Subsequent legal interpretation clar-
ified that two RCTs would be required to demonstrate
that effectiveness [7].
The new effectiveness criterion had a significant
impact on standards of scientific evidence for the next
30 years; however, by the end of the 20th century, even
FDA was beginning to question the need for multiple
Phase III RCTs as proof of effectiveness to justify mar-
ket approval [7]. Criticisms were based primarily on cost
and inefficiency: clinical trials for market approval cost
millions of dollars. In the 1997 Modernization Act of
FDA, the requirement of two RCTs was softened to one,
but RCTs continued to be the gold standard for market
approval of drugs.
S i n c et h ee r ao fH i l l ’s methodological contributions,
various groups have promoted the idea of levels of evi-
dence, but recently, some have questioned the position
of RCTs in a hierarchical model. For instance, Ghaemi
commented that “...the key feature of levels of evidence
to keep in mind is that each level has its own strengths
and weaknesses, and as a result, no single level is com-
pletely useful or useless” (p.10) [8]. Further, Walach and
colleagues emphasized that the RCT hierarchy of evi-
dence is based on the pharmacological model of treat-
ment, and is not always appropriate for the evaluation
of interventions [9]. They argued for a Circular Model,
based on many methodologies and designs – what
might be considered a return to the historical principle
of depending on the ‘weight of the evidence.’ The Circu-
lar Model poses the idea that experimental methods
(such as RCTs) used to evaluate efficacy need to be
complemented by other methods that take into account
real-life issues and clinical applicability. As Walach and
colleagues conclude, “Rather than postulating a single
“best method’’ this view (the Circular Model) acknowl-
edges that there are optimal methods for answering spe-
cific questions, and that a composite of all methods
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science refer to this as a ‘multi-method’ approach.
Limitations of RCTs
RCTs bolster confidence in causal claims related to the
effects of a treatment by eliminating threats to internal
v a l i d i t y .T h e yd ot h i sb yu s i n gt h et o o l so fr a n d o m
assignment and experimental control. However, a medi-
cal science that relies primarily upon achieving internal
validity with a relative neglect of external validity (as, we
argue, many RCTs do) is at great danger of ignoring the
individual and context characteristics that impinge upon
treatment outcome. The five criticisms of RCTs
reviewed below redirect us to consider a more diverse
medical science.
1. RCTs usually lack external validity. For any given
study, clinicians should reasonably ask, to whom do
these results apply? Particularly in mental health, it has
been shown that RCTs tend to employ such strict inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria that the participants are not
representative of the general population of individuals
with a given disorder. As Concato and colleagues
pointed out [10] (p. 1891): “...an observational study
would usually include patients with coexisting illnesses
and a wide spectrum of disease severity.” But the most
typical characteristic that excludes people from RCTs is
just that - the presence of a co-existing disorder [11,12].
Deisboeck [13] observed (p. 2) that “the status quo strat-
egy in medical practice is as simple as it now appears to
be intrinsically flawed: carefully assess a patient’ss y m p -
toms to diagnose his specific disease patterns only to
then treat it with a protocol that is based on the
assumption that most interpersonal characteristics are
rather inconsequential for treatment outcome.”
The external validity (or ecological validity) and gener-
alizability of RCTs have been questioned for a number
of years [14], and a recent report provided an elegant
test of the issue in the context of psychiatry. The study
known as the Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to
Relieve Depression (STAR*D) is a well-known, multi-
centre prospective trial of medications for major depres-
sive disorder [12]. Adults with major depressive disor-
der, and no history of bipolar, psychosis, eating disorder,
or obsessive compulsive disorder, were invited to parti-
cipate in a study that began with an evaluation of citalo-
pram. The investigators analyzed data collected on
almost 3,000 STAR*D participants to address the ques-
tion of whether Phase III RCTs are studying patients
who are representative of depressed outpatients in the
population. Using standard clinical trial criteria, they
separated participants into those who met the inclusion
criteria for a Phase III RCT (N = 635) and those who
did not (N = 2,220). In other words, only 22% of the
STAR*D participants would have passed screening for a
traditional RCT. So in answer to the question raised
above (’to whom do these results apply?’), it appears
that the information obtainable from a traditional RCT
with this sample would not have been directly relevant
for 78% of people suffering from major depressive disor-
der. The STAR*D trial, with its generally more inclusive
eligibility criteria, is actually an example of how external
validity can be improved in RCTs.
2. In the long term, RCTs may actually increase health
risks in the general population. As a corollary to the
issue of external validity, excessively constrained sam-
pling approaches can have consequences for population
health. Health researchers sometimes distinguish
between efficacy and effectiveness. One might say that
all RCTs are efficacy studies (though the terminology
becomes confusing, as they are submitted to FDA as
evidence of effectiveness as spelled out in section 355
(d)), demonstrating benefit in ideal conditions - particu-
larly by selecting only relatively ‘pure’ samples of people
with no co-existing problems. The lack of external valid-
ity caused by these atypical samples means that the
drugs are approved without evidence of effectiveness
(defined as benefit in the broader population, under less
ideal circumstances). Since people with complex health
problems (e.g., hypertension or heart disease) are not
usually participants in RCTs evaluating mental health
treatments, it is reasonable to consider the possibility
that patients prone to adverse effects are not studied.
But approval of the drug then has the potential of
increasing the risk of those vulnerable individuals to
exacerbation of their pre-existing health problems. One
could argue that effectiveness studies using designs such
as case-control methodology that have more external
validity would be more informative about the health
impacts of a new drug for the broader population. With-
out such forms of ‘observational’ studies, drug approval
based only on RCTs may be increasing the health risks
to the populace.
3. The premise that RCTs are the only form of evidence
capable of providing an unbiased estimate of treatment
e f f e c t si sf a l s e . A fundamental reason for the elevated
status of RCTs is the conviction held by many that all
other forms of evidence, even cohort and case-control
studies, overestimate treatment effects. However, some
published research does not support this premise. Con-
cato and colleagues [10] evaluated 99 reports of five dis-
tinct clinical topics and could find no meaningful
differences in the treatment effects on a broad array of
clinical outcomes obtained from RCTs compared to
observational data. As they pointed out, the literature
on psychological, educational, and behavioral treatments
have revealed similar findings: no difference in effect
magnitude reported from RCTs vs. observational studies
[ 1 5 ] .S oe v e nt h o u g hr a n d o m i z a t i o n ,b l i n d i n g ,a n d
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validity, requiring all evidence to fit this model appears
to be unjustified.
4. RCTs are unable to tell clinicians everything they
really want to know. Comparisons between groups of
individuals can obscure processes operating within indi-
viduals. However, RCTs only reveal differences between
treatment and control group means - these aggregated
results are uninformative of the potential benefit of a
treatment for any individual in the study, and more
importantly, for the individual who was not in the study
but whose treatment decisions will nevertheless be
made on the basis of the study [1]. What clinicians
really want to know is whether or not the person sitting
before them is likely to benefit. The averaged results
derived from RCTs offer insufficient or even incorrect
guidance on how to approach a specific case [13]. There
is no doubt that RCTs provide high quality information
about treatments which should be considered, especially
where stratified groups have been included in the analy-
sis. Nevertheless, additional forms of evidence that expli-
citly include individual and context characteristics are
needed to assist clinicians in choosing a course of action
regarding specific patients. Single case experiments, epi-
demiological data, qualitative data and field reports from
clinicians using an intervention are examples of such
additional sources of information.
5. The excessive expense of RCTs leads to vulnerabil-
ities in the quality of evidence.O na v e r a g e ,aP h a s eI I I
clinical drug trial costs > 15 million USD [16], which
raises several important issues.
￿ Part of the cost of an RCT in some countries is
significant payment to participants, which has led to
ap r a c t i c eo f‘guinea-pigging’ [17-19] in which some
people volunteer for research to gain money or free
physical exams. In mental health research it is easy
for people to fake symptoms to gain access to these
rewards, as there are no biomarkers of mental disor-
ders. One of many problems with this practice is
that there is no oversight body to ensure that people
have not recently participated in some previous
RCT; hence, there is no assured washout period
between exposures to different drugs.
￿ The expense of RCTs adds to the cost of medica-
tions that are eventually approved. Hence, the
broader population has the right to ask if they
should be paying for research that has questionable
generalizabilty to the general populace.
￿ The significant costs of RCTs add pressure to bury
negative reports that will prevent a medication from
moving to market, thereby removing the possibility
of development cost recovery by the pharmaceutical
company. The total cost of developing a new drug is
now in excess of US$1.3 billion [16] - a substantial
investment to lose in the case where the promise of
a new drug is not realized. The analysis by Turner
and colleagues highlighted this concern [20] by ana-
lyzing publication bias in the literature on anti-
depressants. In 74 clinical trials of antidepressants,
37 of 38 positive studies were published. But of the
36 negative studies, 33 were either not published or
published in a form that conveyed a positive out-
come. Such evidence for a strong and consistent
commercial distortion in the medical data base used
to support evidence-based medicine is very worri-
some. Without access to published reports that fail
to demonstrate treatment efficacy, the weight of evi-
dence becomes biased in favor of the treatment.
Clinical trial registration systems are, of course,
beginning to address this problem.
￿ The expense of RCTs biases their implementation
toward areas for which commercial funding is possi-
ble; i.e., pharmaceutical interventions. Million dollar
grants are less available for the evaluation of non-
conventional forms of treatment (natural health pro-
ducts, acupuncture, psychotherapy, etc.). When the
valuation of RCTs as “gold standard” is combined
with a systematic bias toward commercial applica-
tions, the weight of evidence itself becomes biased in
favor of pharmaceutical treatments.
￿ A final adverse side effect of the high costs of
RCTs, at least with regard to psychiatric drugs, is
the brief intervention period that is typically
employed to evaluate efficacy. Most RCTs in mental
health now last only 6-8 weeks, which is more eco-
nomical than a 12-week or longer trial more typical
a decade ago (see, for example [21]). But clinicians
have to make decisions about long-term treatment
for their patients, usually based on this very short-
term information. An additional weakness that this
trend imposes is that safety issues resulting from
long term use are often unknown.
The unfortunate result of these financial pressures is
that clinical decisions are made to administer medica-
tions to patients for many years, but the decisions them-
selves may be based on very brief trials conducted with
very unusual people (with no other health problems, for
instance), and without evidence for other interventions
which may be effective.
In conclusion, dismissing or devaluing rigorously col-
lected data obtained with study designs other than
RCTs results in a science that is inherently unsupporta-
ble - as shaky as a one legged stool. Indeed, as Concato
and colleagues argued, the evidence does not support
the commonly accepted concept of a hierarchy of study
designs employed for clinical research [10]. If RCTs are
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evaluating effectiveness, then we need to ask what other
criteria we can use to support a rigorous evidence-based
medicine. This question brings us full circle, back to Sir
Austin Bradford Hill.
The Nine Hill Criteria for Defining Causality
Hill was primarily concerned with causation of disease
when he outlined nine considerations for determining cau-
sal relations in epidemiology, using the association
between smoking and lung cancer as his illustration. How-
ever, the criteria he defined in his 1965 presidential
address to the Section of Occupational Medicine of the
Royal Society of Medicine [22] are also employed to evalu-
ate causal explanations in other contexts [23]. The criteria
will be addressed with special reference to mental health
issues in order to illustrate their potential utility for evalu-
ating treatments in an area of clinical science where medi-
cal and non-medical approaches are often combined.
1. Strength. The strength of association between an
outcome and a putative causative agent is an important
signal of a causal relationship. All things being equal, a
strong association is less likely to occur from extraneous
than causal effects. Hill did caution that no matter how
slight an association may be, it should not be dismissed
until argument for or against causality exists, and he
used as an illustration the evidence that relatively few
persons harboring meningococcus actually become ill
with meningococcal meningitis. As discussed above
(item 4), the fact that a causal relation between two
variables can be detected within persons but are not
observed when data are aggregated should caution
against methods that rely exclusively upon indices of
group differences. Therefore, methodology that relies
solely on mean differences is a limited approach, and
alternatives that accommodate individual differences
may bolster conclusions. Such alternatives might include
qualitative methods [1] or within-subject crossover
designs that are able to demonstrate on-off control of
symptoms in subgroups of the sample.
Defining the strength of association between treat-
ments and symptom severity has been an especially con-
tentious issue in psychiatry, particularly with respect to
depression. There has been much concern that publica-
tion bias against negative findings, discussed above,
results in approval of medications in spite of multiple
trials failing to show benefit over placebo. Using Free-
dom of Information legislation to gain access to unpub-
lished studies of anti-depressant efficacy, Kirsch and
colleagues showed very little difference between medica-
tion and placebo in 35 RCTs on four SSRIs [24]. They
used symptom change on the Hamilton Rating Scale of
Depression (HRSD) as the outcome measure, and con-
firmed previous findings: there was an improvement of
9.6 points for the medication group and 7.80 for placebo
controls. Although this 1.8 point spread is statistically
significant, it is below 3.0, the value necessary for clini-
cal significance used by the National Institute for Clini-
cal Excellence (NICE).
2. Consistency. Hill used this term to refer to obtaining
similar results across different research sites and meth-
odologies, something we might now call replication. As
he pointed out, repeating studies is necessary to prove
the obtained association is not a result of confounding
variables in one setting or group. Similar results from
independent researchers using different methods are
more convincing than a single study. In the social
sciences, this is generally referred to as method triangu-
lation, or multi-methods [9].
3. Specificity. Hill recognized that two different
patients may have varied outcomes from treatment sim-
ply based on individual variables. Accordingly, it is not
always possible to demonstrate specificity, even when a
causal association exists. For example, Hill noted that
smokers have a higher death rate than non-smokers for
many causes of death. However, the relative increase for
other diseases is modest (10-20%) while the increase for
lung cancer is 900 - 1000%. Such specificity in the mag-
nitude of the association provides important evidence
for a causal association. In contrast, there are multiple
determinants of mental disorders (psychosocial, biologi-
cal, societal), making it very difficult to estimate the spe-
cific contribution of any particular predictor variable.
Because of this multicausality, this criterion may not
always be applicable to evaluating causality in areas such
as mental health, where family dynamics and other
social issues can play such a prominent role. Qualitative
m e t h o d sm a ya l s op l a yar o l ei nt h eg e n e r a t i o no f
hypotheses in such situations.
4. Temporality. Temporality refers to the common
sense notion that the cause always precedes the out-
come. Temporality is crucial for determining direction
of causality: e.g., does the decrease in a factor result in a
disease, or does the disease result in the decrease of that
factor? In mental health, elucidating this relationship
can be difficult, but not impossible. For instance,
within-subject crossover study designs (e.g., ABAB
where A is the active treatment and B is a period of pla-
cebo, or at least removal of the active treatment) can be
useful for investigating the effect of a treatment. Assum-
ing the existence of minimal carryover effects and suffi-
cient time devoted for washout, this methodology can
show (a) whether there is an improvement in the
patient’s condition, and (b) whether the treatment was
actually the factor causing the improved outcome and
not a confounding variable. We note that when it is
possible to randomly allocate the treatment sequence,
such cross-over designs can be considered RCTs.
Kaplan et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2011, 11:65
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/11/65
Page 5 of 75. Biological Gradient. A biological gradient is best
described as a dose-response curve: increased treatment
would presumably result in a proportionate increase in
the effect. Hill realized that this criterion might not be
applicable to all research fields, and he recommended
that it be considered only when logical. Within psychia-
try, outcomes vary largely because of individual differ-
ences. For example, it is clear that the optimum dose of
a given medication is not necessarily the highest one
t e s t e d .E v e ni nt h eK i r s c hmeta-analysis described
above, the relationship between severity and response to
medication was not linear [24]. Where the biological
gradient for a disorder is complex (as in mental health),
this criterion is not necessarily applicable for establish-
ing causality.
6. Plausibility. Plausibility refers to whether the cause
and effect can be reasonably connected given the current
state of knowledge within the discipline. Importantly,
Hill states that new findings must not be immediately
dismissed if they do not fit in with current knowledge
("dogma”) on the subject. As Kuhn observed, consider-
able evidence disconfirming the accepted view must
accumulate before new ways of thinking can emerge
from new data [25]. Furthermore, a new treatment could
alleviate symptoms of a disorder, but be disregarded
because its mechanism of action may be unknown.
7. Coherence. Similar to plausibility, coherence refers
to the agreement of a study’sf i n d i n g sw i t hw h a ti s
already known. According to Hill, the cause-effect inter-
pretation of the data should not seriously interfere with
current knowledge of the disease. Furthermore, Hill
mentioned that basic lab evidence should not be a
requirement, primarily because some outcomes would
be difficult to demonstrate in a controlled environment.
For instance, the search for animal models of human
mental disorders has a long history, but no matter how
promising some of the achievements, science can never
validate an animal model for internal mental functions
such as delusions, suicidality, euphoria, or hallucina-
tions. For this reason, the criterion of coherence may
not be a requisite standard for evaluating a novel
approach to something like mental disorders.
8. Experiment. The criterion of experimental evidence
can be fulfilled in many ways. One reason for the wide
acceptance of RCTs for pharmaceuticals is the well-
documented placebo/expectancy effect in psychiatry. As
Kirsch et al. commented regarding their meta-analysis,
the longer-term improvements for medication observed
in those 35 RCTs seemed to be a result of the decreas-
ing placebo response which had been quite high (> 80%)
[24]. Placebo-controlled randomized trials provide one
type of design to control for placebo effects. Other alter-
natives include within-subject crossover designs and
case-control studies.
9. Analogy. The notion that a similar cause results in a
similar outcome is referred to as analogy. Hill described
this criterion as accepting less evidence based on pre-
vious results, citing the case of pregnancy and thalido-
mide. If a new drug were to demonstrate negative
consequences during pregnancy, we would be less hesi-
tant to stop its use even if little evidence of harm exists,
because of the tremendous social and personal cost that
resulted from thalidomide. This criterion may not be
relevant to all areas of health care treatment, particularly
mental health. As with the criteria of specificity and bio-
logical gradient, the issue comes down to the multicaus-
ality of mental disorders and the multifinality of patient
outcomes. Two patients presenting with similar illness
sometimes respond quite differently to an identical
treatment. Likewise, the justification that a past patient
responded positively to a drug does not ensure that the
current patient will, which introduces uncertainty about
the nature of the association between the treatment and
the outcome.
Hill emphasized that not all nine criteria would be
applicable to all situations. For instance, five appear to
be applicable for the demonstration of causality in men-
tal health: Strength, Consistency, Temporality, Plausibil-
ity, and Experiment. For any application, common sense
needs to prevail when considering criteria to evaluate
causality.
Discussion
One could argue that over-reliance on RCTs has fos-
tered a less critical form of thinking in the evaluation of
health care treatments. Several years ago Smith and Pell
wrote a satirical, insightful commentary on the need to
do an RCT of the effectiveness of parachutes for the
prevention of major trauma caused by gravity [26]. They
concluded that people “...who insist that all interventions
need to be validated by a randomised controlled trial
need to come down to earth with a bump” (p. 1460).
We suggest that ignoring data from sources other than
RCTs results in a one-legged stool that brings progress
in health treatment down with a bump.
The methods we use constrain the types of observa-
tions we can make. Because of this, it is important to
use as many different sources of information as possible.
Multi-method research can provide converging evidence
on treatment effects, where “multi-method” refers to
obtaining diverse sources of information that are mini-
mally related to the existing sources. Unfortunately, it is
increasingly difficult to fund or publish studies that are
not RCTs. While the majority of social scientists fly the
multi-method banner, it is RCTs that primarily hold the
attention of health researchers. This dependence on
RCTs means that the weight of evidence is precariously
balanced upon a single method, a clear example of the
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clinical research propagate to clinical practice, failure to
consider multiple sources of information compromises
the foundation on which medical decisions are based,
and on which the fate of lives may rest.
Summary
In summary, over-reliance on RCTs a) has been influ-
enced in part by market pressures relevant to pharma-
ceutical companies, b) was stimulated significantly by
the 1962 amendments to the American Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, and c) is not scientifically sound. As Par-
ker stated (p. 971) [1], “...it seems imprudent to assume
that one type of methodology provides the only path to
knowledge.” There are alternatives to depending solely
on RCTs, especially from the perspective provided by
the Hill criteria, which enable us to more fully evaluate
treatments in health care.
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